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The Dynamics of Forced Neoliberalism in 
Nigeria Since the 1980s
Victor Olumide Ekanade 
Redeemer’s University, Nigeria
Abstract: Over the last 30 years, the logic of market liberalization has 
increasingly permeated the social and economic facets of political and 
economic discourse to such an extent that the core values about the 
responsibilities and obligations of nation-states to their citizens have 
been strained. The welfarist ethos featuring in the public fi nance of some 
European and North American countries for much of the twentieth 
century included values such as equity and access, which manifested 
in the subsidization and aff ordability of social amenities. The welfarist 
concept, premised on the experience of western European economies, 
was based on the logic that if a large proportion of the population could 
not aff ord clean water, health care, or education for their children, 
long-term corporate interests of the society would be undermined. 
State-subsidized provision of these essentials was thus fully embraced 
because of the understanding of the short and long-term public interest 
involved. However, by the 1980s, changes in international markets 
fostered a precipitous decline in African economies. Many governments 
thus jett isoned its state-centered economic strategy since it could no 
longer fund public expenditure on sustainable basis. Nowhere was the 
shift in economic policy more pronounced as in Nigeria. The drastic 
decline in national revenue due to a dip in international price of oil 
led to Nigeria’s balance of payment defi cit making the introduction of 
forced neoliberal economic policy inevitable. Analyzing the dynamics 
of policy formulation and implementation since the 1980s, this article 
argues that Nigeria’s uncritical embrace of Western-styled neoliberal 
economic policy largely undermined the country’s quest for a 
sustainable economic development.  
Keywords: Nigeria; Neoliberalism; Social Welfare; Democracy; Poverty; 
Military Regimes; Economic Reforms; Privatization; Corruption.
Introduction
Nigeria’s experience with neoliberal economic policy presents a classic example 
of a state which progressively shifted from a relative welfare state to ad-hoc 
welfarist state and full blown free market economy. The implementation of 
Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) in the country between 1986 and early 
1990s, in addition to neoliberal policies under civil regimes from 1999 until the 
present, have had colossal implications for Nigeria’s national development. In 
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this neoliberal context, democracy was re-established to satisfy market demands 
without adequate regard to social needs. Neoliberal reforms were not concerned 
with social issues but with market effi  ciency, which worked against the basic 
tenets of human rights and constitutional safeguards for Nigerian citizens. Forced 
neoliberalism is state policy foisted on the people in a democracy without their 
due consent. This practice is typical of politics in post-colonial Africa. 
Neoliberal economic policies and profound internal socio-political 
convulsions are challenging African states, including Nigeria. Even though they 
are acknowledged as independent states within the global community, African 
countries have not adequately established themselves as nations with national 
identities. They also have not conquered the challenges of good governance and 
gained their economic autonomy. The post-Westphalian states of Europe treat 
African states as dependent associates, providing them with fi nancial aid through 
international agencies such as the Brett on Woods institutions.1 Nigeria for instance 
is a subordinate unit responsive to the policies of international organizations, and 
subject to the imposition of their programs such as the World Bank’s SAPs based 
on neoliberal principles.2 The SAP instituted in Nigeria in 1986 under General 
Ibrahim Babangida proved dreadful in terms of implementation and outcomes as 
it led to a drop in the standard of living of the majority of Nigerians as subsidies 
on essential commodities and services were removed, provoking a series of 
devastating riots.  Furthermore, the outcomes of neoliberal policies established 
with the return of democratic regime of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, between 1999 
and 2007, were also disappointing. As a democratic regime, it was expected that 
the Obasanjo government would create conditions aimed at reducing poverty 
and inequality. Rather the established democracy abided with market standards 
without due consideration for the needs of the citizenry. This article examines 
the contradiction of the institutionalization of democracy in Nigeria as a moral 
value while at the same time negating the social rights of its citizens. It argues 
that the growth of electoral democracy occurred at the same time of heightened 
social problems in the country, and shows how neoliberalism since 1999 worsened 
the plight of a large segment of the Nigerian population, deepening poverty, 
inequality, unemployment, and social exclusion.
1  George Clement Bond, “Globalization, Neoliberalism, Historical Conditionalities,” The 
Journal of African American History 88, no. 4 (Autumn, 2003): 330. Peter Lewis, “From 
Prebendalsim to Predation: The Political Economy of Decline in Nigeria,” The Journal of 
Modern African Studies 34 no.1 (Mar, 1996), 81.
2  Babawale Tunde and Onuoha Browne, “The State Corruption and the Challenges of Good 
Governance,” in Rich but Poor, Corruption and Good governance in Nigeria, ed. Lai Olurode 
and Remi Anifowoshe (Lagos: University of Lagos, 2005), 64.
Ekanade  | 3
Journal of Retracing Africa, Volume 1, Issue 1, Spring 2014
htt p://encompass.eku.edu/jora/
Conceptual Framework
The received wisdom in literature on neoliberalism in Africa and Latin America as 
posited by Graham Harrison, George Clement Bond, Margaret Hanson and James 
Hentz , Adebayo Olukoshi, Chibuzo Nwoke, and Pablo Gonzalez Casanova is that 
the failure of leadership in these continents and the need to revamp their distressed 
economies necessitated the introduction of neoliberal policies in the polities.3 
This amounts to a misreading of these societies, especially African states where 
neoliberalism is fundamentally in disharmony with African communal ways of 
life but fi nds relevance in the socialist mode of production. Another consensus in 
literature is that structural adjustment and neoliberal policies imposed on Africa 
and Latin America all carry a specifi c political and economic principle that is 
decisively anti-people- anti working class but pro-private capital. One of the many 
tragedies of neoliberalism is that in its bid to promote the forces of the market and 
long term interests of the private capitalist class, systematic assaults have been 
launched on the African and Latin American states’ welfare, social, and public 
expenditure programs, which have in turn resulted in backlash. Thus it cannot 
be assumed that developmental needs of the state and citizenry will be served by 
simply turning to the market. The body of literature mentioned above does not 
however explain how neoliberalism interacted with the democratization process, 
corruption, and constitutional provisions in these states. This is a gap this article 
will att empt to fi ll in, using the context of the Nigerian state. 
According to Adejumobi Said, historically the provision of social welfare 
services has been a state responsibility in both developed and developing 
countries. However the introduction of privatization, which was meant to help 
curtail government expenditure, creates new social problems or exacerbates 
existing ones which would require supplementary public spending in order 
to contain them.4 For Jarret Alfred5 and Claude Ake,6 colonialism left behind a 
legacy of a social welfare system irrelevant to the social needs of the masses in 
Nigeria, as it was structured for profi t maximization and essentially designed to 
3  Graham Harrison, “Economic Faith, Social Project and a Misreading of African Society; 
the Travails of Neoliberalism in Africa,” Third World Quarterly 26, no, 8 (2005): 1303-1320; 
Bond; Margaret Hanson and James Hentz , “Neocolonialism and Neoliberalism in South 
Africa and Zambia,” Political Science Quarterly 114, no. 3 (1999): 479-502; Olukoshi Adebayo 
and Chibuzo. N. Nwoke, “The Theoretical and Conceptual Underpinnings of Structural 
Adjustment Programmes” in Structural Adjustment in West Africa, eds. Olukoshi Adebayo, 
Omotayo Olaniyan and Femi Aribisala (Lagos: NIIA, 1994), 11-27.
4  Adejumobi Said, “Privatisation Policy and the Delivery of Social Welfare Services in 
Africa: A Nigerian Example,” Journal of Social Development in Africa 14, no. 2 (1999): 87-108.
5  Alfred A. Jarrett , “Problems and Prospects of the Social Welfare Systems of Sierra Leone 
and Nigeria,” International Social Work 34, no. 2 (April, 1991): 143-157. 
6  Claude Ake, A Political Economy of Africa (New York: Longman, 1981).
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meet not the needs of the colony but those of the colonial masters. Thus it did not 
encourage investment in social welfare schemes for the African population. After 
independence, Nigeria inherited the outdated social welfare system left behind 
by the colonial order. This had serious implications for structural adaptation, cost 
effi  ciency, and eff ectiveness of these public corporations in terms of delivery of 
welfare services since most of the public corporations were centrally controlled. 
For Arowosegbe Jeremiah, the inherent character of the “imported state,” oriented 
exclusively towards maintenance of law and order, explains the overdeveloped 
status of the state’s apparatuses of violence, which was a tool for maximizing 
colonial exploitation, relative to its educational, health, and other welfare systems. 
Local elites under successive regimes in Nigeria have not innovatively engaged 
with reinventing the state but have continued along the same trajectory. 7  
Historical Background of Neo-liberalism
Neoliberalism is rooted in the classical liberal ideas of Adam Smith and David 
Ricardo. Both viewed the market as a self-regulating mechanism tending towards 
equilibrium of supply and demand, thus securing the most effi  cient allocation 
of resources. These British economists and philosophers considered that any 
constraint on free competition would interfere with the natural effi  ciency of market 
mechanisms, inevitably leading to social stagnation, political corruption, and the 
creation of unresponsive state bureaucracies.8 In modern times, neoliberalism 
emerged as a synonym for the mainly externally directed att empt to remove the 
state from the economy. The World Bank’s Berg Report claimed that many of 
Africa’s economic problems emanated from excessive ineffi  cient state intervention 
in the economy.9 
Neoliberalism is steeped in a system of economic, social, and political 
ideals that are rightwing versions of the modern post-enlightenment themes of 
rationality, democracy, and individual freedom. Neoclassical economics rethought 
these eighteenth and nineteenth century principles of economic modernism and 
for a while reluctantly abandoned pure market determination for limited state 
regulation during the Keynesian interlude of post-war period. During the 1970’s 
when widespread problems of stagfl ation were deemed beyond the reach of 
Keynesian fi scal policy, nineteenth century liberalism was revived as a rightwing 
7  Jeremiah Arowosegbe, “Claude Ake: Political Integration and the Challenges of 
Nationhood in Africa,” Development and Change 42, no. 1 (January, 2011): 349-365. 
8  Steger Manfred, Globalization: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003). 
9  Harrison, “Economic Faith, Social Project,” 1303-1304.
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version of neoliberalism.10 
Neoliberalism now emerged as monetarism in the 1970s, a refl ection of the 
triumph in the west of the monetarist shade of neo-classical economics, which 
was against Keynesianism and all it stood for. Monetarism is essentially about 
ascendency of the market and “peripheralization” of the state, which in the 
monetarists’ view had become too large, unfi t and ineffi  cient, and excessively 
interventionist. As part of the eff ort to reduce the size and role of the state, they 
called for the withdrawal of a host of subsidies that were introduced at the height 
of the Keynesian revolution, the elimination of subventions to public enterprises 
and privatization of those enterprises.11 
The globalization of the monetarist agenda was skillfully assisted with the 
coming to power in the early 1980s of conservative governments dedicated to the 
cause of monetarism in the leading western countries that dominate the world 
capitalist economy. The most prominent of these governments were those of 
Margaret Thatcher in Britain, Ronald Reagan in the United States, Helmut Kohl in 
West Germany, and later Brian Mulroney in Canada.12 They all dismantled their 
welfare states in response to the global economic crisis of the 1970’s, the rising costs 
of labor in Europe and USA, and the rapid development of capitalism in newly 
industrialized countries (NICs) of Asia that led to increased competition, reduced 
profi t rate, and the crises of overproduction. The resultant eff ect of the emergence 
of these rightwing governments, unrepentant in the pursuit of monetarism, was 
the reorientation of the dominant outlook within the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and World Bank. These two key institutions shed their Keynesian toga and 
embraced monetarist principles.13 
The outcome of this reorientation in the IMF and World Bank had fundamental 
and colossal consequences for developing countries. By 1983/1984, the African 
debt crisis was serious as debt servicing alone consumed about a third of all their 
foreign receipts and moved them into severe depression.14 Thus, the World Bank 
and IMF were able to use the debt crisis in Africa to gain substantial leverage over 
10  Elaine Hartwick and Richard Peet, “Rethinking Sustainable Development: Neoliberalism 
and Nature: The case of the WTO,” Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science 
590 (November, 2003): 188-211.
11  Adebayo and Chibuzo,  “The Theoretical and Conceptual Underpinnings of Structural 
Adjustment Programmes,” 14.
12  Rick Rowden, “An Overview of the Increased Coordination of the International Monetary 
Fund, World Bank and World Trade, Trade Liberalization Policies,” 2nd draft working paper, 
Washington DC, October, 2009.
13  Adebayo and Nwoke, “The Theoretical and Conceptual Underpinnings of Structural 
Adjustment programme,”14-15.
14  Richard Sandbrook, The Politics of Africa’s Economic Stagnation (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989), 24.
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economic policies in Africa which hitherto was limited. In their att empt to come 
to terms with the crisis of their local economies, developing countries approached 
the World Bank and IMF for fi nancial aid, giving the United States the chance to 
sell them the Brady Plan.15 Western countries that dominate these fi nancial bodies 
such as the United States not only ensured that the two institutions fell in line with 
their new economic thinking but also encouraged them to make the acceptance 
and implementation of market reforms  a pre-condition for fi nancial assistance 
to debtor nations.16 Given the comatose state of most post-colonial third world 
economies, they embraced the new policies and conditions. The 1980s was the era 
of monetarists’ domination of economic policies in the third world. The IMF and 
the World Bank eff ectively imposed their policies of SAP as a panacea of economic 
transformation throughout developing countries, including Nigeria. 
Nigeria’s Experience with Structural Adjustment 
As a major oil-producing nation, Nigeria enjoyed almost a decade of unprecedented 
revenue boom arising from the petroleum price increases of the 1970’s. One 
remarkable characteristic of Nigeria’s expenditure during this period was its 
“welfarist” orientation with government domestic investments and concentrated 
provision of a massive transport system, road networks, public buildings, and 
health infrastructure. Employment rates soared, coupled with increases in 
subsidies on food, transport, health, fuel, and education.17 The Shehu Shagari 
regime (1979-1983) systematized the subsidized sale and distribution of specifi c 
commodities known as essential commodities to Nigerians. These included 
rice, milk, beef, sugar, among other items. These products were imported by the 
Nigerian government through the Nigerian National Supply Company and sold 
to Nigerians at rates below prevailing market prices. These subsidies remained 
all through the Shagari era but terminated with the introduction of SAPs in 
1986, which led to the removal of subsidies, reduction of public expenditures, 
15 John T. Rourke, International Politics on World Stage (New York: Mc Graw Hill, 2000), 
467- 468. The Brady Plan emphasized that bank creditors should grant debt relief to debtor 
states in exchange for greater assurance of collectability in the form of principal and 
interest collateral. Also, debt relief for debtor states needed to be linked to some assurance 
of economic reform and the resulting debt should be highly tradeable to allow creditors 
to diversify risk more widely throughout the fi nancial and investment community. 
See EMTA, “The Brady Plan,” accessed April 22, 2013, htt p://www.emta.org/template.
aspx?id=35&terms=brady+plan.
16  David .K. Leonard and Scott  Strauss, Africa’s Stalled Development: International Causes 
and Cures (London: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2003), 25-26. See also Elmar Alvater, 
“Postneoliberalism or Postcapitalism? The Failure of Neoliberalism in the Financial Market 
Crisis,” Development Dialogue Uppsala no. 51 (January, 2009): 73-88. 
17  Thandika Mkandawire, “Fiscal Structure, State Contraction and Political Responses from 
Africa,” in Between Liberalisation and Oppression: The Politics of  Structural Adjustment in Africa, 
eds. Mkandiawire Thandika and Olukoshi Adebayo (Dakar: Codesria, 1995), 37. 
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privatization, and devaluation of domestic currency.18
Part of the reason for the introduction of SAPs was the economic decline that 
started in the early 1980s.  The international source of the crisis was the dramatic 
fl agging of the oil markets in the fi rst half of the 1980s, which made the country’s 
fi nancial position deteriorate. Export revenues plunged by 53 percent between 
1980 and 1982, from US$27.1 billion to US$12.7 billion.19 At the same time, the 
value of internal public debt increased by 72 percent from US$8.5 billion in 1979 
to $26.9 billion in 1983 while external debt was estimated at $14.13 billion during 
this period.20 As commitments accumulated, short-term borrowing increased, and 
interest rates escalated. On the domestic scene, the downturn was accentuated by 
the monocultural nature of the economy, the character of the politicians during the 
return of the civilian governments in the early 1908s, who were fl ippant with federal 
funds, and the endemic corruption of the same class and gross mismanagement of 
the national treasury. The crisis raised questions of sustainability of state subsidy 
as social services suff ered due to underfunding. The industrial sector shut down 50 
percent of its fi rms and thousands of its workers were laid off .21 These multifaceted 
crises provided the immediate domestic context for the adoption by the Nigerian 
state of an orthodox program of structural adjustment sponsored by the Brett on 
Woods institutions.22
The fi rst serious att empt to examine the role of the state in the Nigerian 
economy came in 1981 when the Shehu Shagari regime appointed a presidential 
commission of inquiry to examine the parastatals. The commission’s report 
recommended an increased role for the private sector in administering the partially 
government-owned organizations.  This recommendation was to cut government 
expenditure at the expense of the masses. In the context of the debt problems, the 
Shagari administration in April 1982 introduced the Economic Stabilization Act to 
control imports, introduce more discipline into the monetary system, and narrow 
the gap between public expenditure and income through cuts in government 
18  Ikubolajeh, Logan and Kidane Mengisteab, “Introduction,” in Beyond Economic 
Liberalization in Africa: Structural Adjustments and Alternatives, eds. Kidane Mengisteab and 
Ikubolajeh Logan (London: Zed, 1995), 3.
19   Lewis Peter, “The Dysfunctional State of Nigeria,” in Short of the Goal: U.S. Policy and Poorly 
Performing States, eds. Nancy Birdsall, Milan Vaishnav, and Robert L. Ayres (Washington 
D.C: Center for Global Development 2006), 83-116.
20  James Guseh and  Emmanuel Oritsejafor, “Government Size, Political Freedom and 
Economic Growth in Nigeria, 1960-2000,” Journal of Third World Studies  xxiv, no 1 ( 2007): 
142.
21  Olukoshi Adebayo, “The Politics of Structural Adjustment in Nigeria,” in Between 
Liberalisation and Oppression: The Politics of  Structural Adjustment in Africa, eds. P. Thandika 
Mkandiawire and Adebayo Olukoshi (Dakar: Codesria, 1995), 163-164.
22  Adebayo Olukoshi, “From Crisis to Adjustment in Nigeria,” in The Politics of Structural 
Adjustment in Nigeria (London: James Currey and Heinemann, 1993), 1.
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expenditure.23  The stabilization program failed because the regime was reluctant 
to remove subsidies and commercialize public enterprises. Many stalwarts of the 
ruling National Party of Nigeria (NPN) owed their enormous wealth to their direct 
control over the parastatals, marketing of rice, fertilizer, and petroleum products.24 
Consequently, the Shagari government approached the IMF for an extended fund 
facility of between N1.9 and N2.4 billion. The IMF insisted on certain conditions 
including privatization, a curb on government spending, trade liberalization, 
and introduction of sales tax. 25 No concrete agreement was reached with the IMF 
before the government was overthrown on December 31, 1983. 26 
The successive regime of Muhammadu Buhari agreed with the IMF on 
the need for fundamental reforms in the Nigerian economy but was unwilling 
to accept part of the IMF’s recommendations such as currency devaluation, 
privatization, liberalization of trade, and withdrawal of the petroleum subsidy. 
It nevertheless embraced the policy of commercialization but insisted on state 
regulations. This resulted in a stalemate and the outcome was the tightening of 
the boycott  of Nigeria by western banks and export credit guarantee agencies. The 
leading fi nancial institutions insisted that the government had to obtain a clean 
bill of health from the IMF before the country’s debt, put at about $20 billion in 
1984, could be rescheduled and fresh capital injections authorized.27 The second 
approach adopted by Buhari’s government, in its bid to mitigate the eff ects of 
the disparate pressing demands by the IMF and Nigerians on the economy, was 
the introduction of the policy of counter trade, a modern day variant of trade by 
barter, with Brazil and some West European states. The scale of the counter trade 
deals was however too small and costly relative to the magnitude of the country’s 
economic problems28 Thus, the regime introduced a comprehensive package of 
austerity measures as part of its own stabilization eff orts with severe restriction 
23  Adebayo Olukoshi, “The Management of Nigeria’s External Debt: Issues and 
Problems” in Nigerian External Debt Crisis: Its Management, ed. Adebayo Olukoshi (Lagos: 
Malthouse,1990), 31.
24  Ibid.  See also Adebayo Olukoshi and Tajudeen Abdulraheem, “Nigeria, Crisis 
Management under the Buhari Administration,” Review of African Political Economy no. 34 
(1985):  95-96.
25  Robert. H. Bates, John H. Coates and Jeff rey G. Williamson, “Lost Decades; Lessons from 
Post-Independence Latin America for Today’s Africa,” NBER Working Paper 12610, National 
Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusett s (2006), 20.
26  Yahaya Sheu, “State Versus Market: The Privatization Program of the Nigerian State,” 
in The Politics of Structural Adjustment, ed. Adebayo Olukoshi (London: James Currey and 
Heinemann, 1993), 17-18.
27  Adebayo Olukoshi, “The Politics of Structural Adjustment in Nigeria,” 170-171. See also 
Yahaya Sheu, “State Versus Market: The Privatization Programme of the Nigerian State,” in 
The Politics of Structural Adjustment, 17-19.
28  Olukoshi, “The Politics of Structural Adjustment in Nigeria,” 170-171.
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on imports. This made it diffi  cult for local industries to procure essential imported 
raw materials forcing many of them to close shop. Subsequently, many workers 
were laid off , and the government itself retrenched many employees to increase its 
“cost eff ectiveness.” All of these actions were accompanied by high infl ation. The 
price of basic food items rose, and life became increasingly diffi  cult for the masses 
and even the affl  uent.29 
Adequate health care is critical for the worker to maintain his productivity 
while education is important in order to improve the quality of that productivity. 
Cost recovery measures introduced in health and education sectors by the Buhari 
regime had a reverberating impact on the citizenry. The Nigerian constitution 
stipulates that federal, state, and local governments should fund, in a coordinated 
manner, a three-tier system of health care. However, total health expenditure 
in real terms declined sharply from a total of N825.5 million in 1980 to N128.3 
million in 1984 representing a fall of about eighty-fi ve percent.  The negative 
impact of this manifested in the increase of the under fi ve-year-old mortality 
rate which moved from 181.1 per 1,000 live births in 1980 to 192.4 per 1,000 live 
births in 1985.30 The illness rate in rural areas also approached 100 per thousand, 
particularly among children and the aged people in the 1983-1984 period.  The 
education sector also worsened and with it came employees’ inability to benefi t 
from educational policy31. The total number of secondary schools in the country 
fell from 38,211 in 1984 to 35,281 in 1985. In addition, the government imposed 
heavy levies, indiscriminately on parents of school children. At the tertiary level, 
the government withdrew the feeding program of students, thus increasing the 
cost for students and their parents32 Buhari’s legitimacy was soon dissipated by 
his authoritarian nature and he was deposed by General Ibrahim Babangida in 
29  Peter Lewis, “From Prebendalism to Predation: The Political Economy of Decline in 
Nigeria,” The Journal of Modern African Studies 34, no. 1 (Mar, 1996): 79-103. See also Adebayo 
Olukoshi, “The Politics of Structural Adjustment in Nigeria,” 157-185.  Between 1979 and 
1989 the price of garri increased by 700 percent, rice by 1,700 percent, beans by 1,350 percent 
yams 3,000 percent, frozen fi sh 900 percent, beer 350 percent milk 1,500 percent, bread 2,000 
percent, and palm oil 300 percent.  See The Financial Post, Lagos, October 1- 4, 1989, 9.
30  L.A Amaghionyeodiwe, “Fiscal Federalism, Health Care Spending and National 
Development: The Nigerian Experience,” in Fiscal Federalism and Nigeria’s Economic 
Development, ed., Ben 
Aigbokhan (Ibadan: Nigerian Economic Society, 1999), 394. See also Nigeria Demographic 
and Health Survey, 1990.
31  Ibeanu Okechukwu, “The Deteriorating Condition of The Nigerian Peasantry,” in Dead-
End to Nigerian Development: An Investigation on the Social, Economic and Political Crisis in 
Nigeria, ed. Okwudiba Nnoli  (Dakar: Codesria, 1993), 142.
32  Okwudiba Nnoli, “The Deteriorating Condition of the Nigerian Working Class,” in Dead-
End to Nigerian Development: An Investigation on the Social, Economic and Political Crisis in 
Nigeria, 169. 
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August, 1985.
In 1985, Nigeria was still reeling under a heavy debt burden with declining 
oil revenues, and Babangida opened a national debate on whether Nigeria should 
take the IMF loan or not and the role the government should play in managing the 
economic crisis. The premeditated decision of the regime prevailed as Babangida, 
despite the people’s protests, adopted a supposedly homegrown adjustment 
program akin to the IMF prescriptions. It was obvious that the debate was a 
smokescreen because Babangida had earlier appointed Chief Olu Falae, a pro-IMF 
personality as the nation’s fi nance minister and Babangida himself had insisted on 
the necessity to adjust the naira to its ‘realistic’ value.33 This was the SAP, which 
Babangida claimed would halt economic stagnation and revitalize growth. The SAP 
was a package of neoliberal economic reforms, primarily aimed at strengthening 
market forces and retrenching the state. This had dire consequences for the Nigerian 
political economy and its peoples, state, agriculture, and industry.34 For instance, 
the public sector carried out its program of retrenchment through sackings and 
various other means. One of these was to disband existing public enterprises such 
as the Nigerian National Supply Company and the various commodity boards. 
Another was to merge enterprises. Reorganization in corporations such as Nigeria 
Railway Corporation, Nigeria Airways, and Nigeria Airport Authorities led to the 
retrenchment of 8,000, 2,500, and 2,000 workers respectively in 1988. In same year, 
1988, 32,000 workers in the textile industry were retrenched as spasmodic and 
eventual permanent closure of industries ensued.35
Faced with ever declining standards of living and without resources that 
formerly co-opted oppositions and nurtured clients, the state under General 
Babangida increasingly relied on coercion to implement structural adjustment 
plans.36 General Babangida sought to assuage popular opposition to adjustment 
through selective provisioning of certain welfare facilities through institutions such 
as Directorate for food, roads, and rural infrastructure (DFRRI) to provide special 
assistance to rural areas, networks of Peopleand Community Banks to extend 
credit to small scale and local borrowers. The Bett er Life Programme sponsored 
by the First Lady was also intended to promote the production of craft works 
33  Olukoshi Adebayo and Tajudeen Abdulraheem, “Nigeria, Crisis Management under the 
Buhari Administration,” Review of African Political Economy 12, no. 34 (1985): 101.
34  Att ahiru Jega, “The State and Identity Transformation under Structural Adjustment 
in Nigeria,” in Identity Transformation and Identity Politics under Structural Adjustment in 
Nigeria. ed. Att ahiru Jega, (Uppsala: Nordiska African Institute and Centre for Research 
and Documentation,  2003), 31-33. 
35  Okwudiba Nnoli, “The Deteriorating Condition of the Nigerian Working Class,” 162.
36  M. Paul Lubeck, “The Crisis of African Development: Confl icting Interpretations and 
Resolutions,” Annual Review of Sociology, 18 (1992): 519-540.
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among the poor, especially women. These initiatives were mostly underfunded, 
ephemeral, or suff used with corruption, and their impact on popular welfare was 
questionable.37
Education was consistently underfunded at less than 6 percent of total 
expenditure of the sector during this regime. In previous years though, especially 
between 1978 and 1982 the federal government spent more than 6 percent of total 
expenditure on the educational sector. However, in 1992, the federal government 
spent less than 1 percent of its total expenditure on the sector.38 This had severe 
repercussions for infrastructure, teaching, and research activities, and on the 
quality of students produced. It aff ected the morale of teachers who were owed 
arrears of salaries for several months and who had to abandon their duties out 
of necessity to seek other means of sustenance.39 Healthcare equally suff ered due 
to the withdrawal of subsidy from that sector under Babangida. Infant mortality 
increased from 87.2 per 1,000 live births in 1985 to 191 per 100 live births in 1993 
as access to safe water also diminished from 45 per 1,000 in 1985 to 40 per 1,000 in 
1993 when he stepped aside. By 1991, debt servicing ate up 47 percent of the overall 
federal budget and remained so in 1992 and 1993. By 1993, the defi cit Babangida 
accumulated was put at N90-N100 billion. The annual budget for that year was 
N120 billion. One is left to wonder how a country that was adjusting could aff ord to 
amass huge defi cit year after year, especially after 1989.40 Thus, the SAP rather than 
helping to revamp the economy simply fed into the existing dynamic of decline, 
thereby becoming an integral factor in the continuation of Nigeria’s economic 
crisis. Cumulatively, the SAP produced considerable hardship, poverty, and 
discontentment across the Nigerian society. The middle class was overwhelmed 
by declining purchasing power and unemployment. Coping mechanisms for some 
workers included running their private cars as taxis to augment income after the 
day’s work, while low income urban dwellers were driven to subsistence levels 
and school children had to hawk wares to supplement family incomes.41
The SAP was eventually discontinued in 1994 under the General Sani 
Abacha regime as part of his legitimization schemes. It was replaced with a policy 
37  Lewis, “From Prebendalism to Predation,” 88.
38  Dipo Busari and Olaniyan Olanrewaju, “Decentralisation and Education in Nigeria: 
Issues and Options, in Fiscal Federalism and Nigeria’s Economic Development, ed. Aigbokhan 
Ben (Ibadan: Nigerian Economic Society, 1999), 516.
39  Cyril Daddieh, “Education Adjustment Under Severe Recessionary Pressures: The Case of 
Ghana,” in Beyond Economic Liberalisation in Africa: Structural Adjustment and the Alternatives, 
ed. Kidane Mengisteab and Ikubolajeh Logan (London: Zed Books, 1995), 42. 
40  Adedayo Oluyemi-Kusa, “The Structural Adjustment Program of the Nigerian State”, in, 
Structural Adjustment in West Africa, ed. Olukoshi Adebayo, Omotayo Olaniyan and Femi 
Aribisala (Lagos: Pumark Publishers, NIIA, 1994), 91.
41  Lewis, “From Prebendalism to Predation,” 98.
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of guided deregulation meant to enhance economic development by appropriate 
discretionary interventions from the government.42 According to Kunle Amuwo, 
the Abacha regime actually favored a statist economic policy, but certainly not a 
nationalist agenda. Amuwo noted further that “this way Abacha set the tone and 
tenor to pocket the economy and privatize state fi nances.”43 
Abacha, Neoliberalism, and the Nigerian Textile Industry
The application of neoliberal policies in the Nigerian textile sector can be used to 
dramatize the government’s wholesale mortgage of indigenous industrial fortunes 
and their potential benefi ts. General Sani Abacha compounded the economic 
misfortunes of the Nigerian manufacturing sector by extending the frontiers of 
the neoliberal agenda to the textile sector with his decision to take Nigeria into 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1994 without providing safeguards.44 
The WTO agreement opened Nigerian markets to all kinds of imported goods 
and turned Nigeria into a dumping ground for frivolous imports. The agreement 
was endorsed for political reasons – personally for Abacha to garner support and 
sympathy from the international community, which had turned Nigeria into a 
pariah state and perhaps to provide patronage for his cronies. No sooner had 
Nigeria signed the WTO pact than Nigerian industries, including 135% textile 
fi rms began crumbling like a pack of cards.45  The negative eff ect of unbridled 
importation subsequently led to a drastic decline in the contribution of the 
manufacturing sector to Nigeria’s GDP.46 Cheap Chinese-made textiles against 
which Nigerian fi rms could not favorably compete fl ooded Nigerian markets. Not 
even the African Growth and Opportunities Act (AGOA) passed in the twilight 
days of Clinton’s administration in the United States could reassure them.47  This 
unbridled importation of textiles impoverished cott on farmers and brought untold 
hardships on textile industry workers who were subsequently laid off  because 
locally produced textiles could not favorably compete with Chinese textiles which 
were cheap.
No nation has developed without a textile industry. The textile industry 
was one that set Britain on a path of sustainable economic growth in the mid 
42  Ifamose Folasade, “The Fourth Republic Economic Reforms in Nigeria and the Millennium 
Development Goal One: A perspective,” African Studies Review 9 (June 2010): 410.
43  Kunle Amuwo, “Transition as democratic regression,” in Nigeria during the Abacha Years: 
1993 – 1998: The Domestic and International Politics of Democratization. eds. Kunle Amuwo, 
Daniel Bach and Yann Lebeau (Ibadan: IFRA, 2001), 5.
44  The Guardian (Lagos), October 28, 2007, 37.
45  The Guardian (Lagos), September 4, 2005, 16-17.
46  The Punch Editorial (Lagos), August 2, 2006, 16.
47  The Guardian (Lagos), September 4, 2005, 16.
Ekanade  | 13
Journal of Retracing Africa, Volume 1, Issue 1, Spring 2014
htt p://encompass.eku.edu/jora/
nineteenth century. The textile industry uses relatively simple technology and it 
is an industry well suited for Nigeria with its huge population and rich cott on 
growing culture. Nigerian-made textiles had popularity in the export market and 
gained prominence in places as distant as Dakar.  In the mid-1980s, the industry 
had about 350,000 people in over 200 mills. As of 2010, however, the Nigerian 
textile industries had less than 2,000 persons in their employ.48 Nigeria’s public 
enterprises were a serious drain on the national budget in the immediate post-
SAP years.49 Abacha did not change their fortunes in any positive way. According 
to Kunle Amuwo, “a predatory regime like Abacha’s was characterized by a 
distinctive patt ern of economic management, including arbitrary change, defi cit 
fi nancing, and capital fl ight. More importantly in the realm of social choice, the 
“rationality” of the market was vitiated by the “logic” of rent seeking.50 
The Abacha regime also made att empts to implement welfare policies and 
programs to mitigate the adverse impact of its economic policy. A key model here 
was the Petroleum Trust fund meant to rehabilitate public roads, fund education, 
and provide critical infrastructure in the health sector.  Its implementation was 
skewed as it mediated well in the Northern part of Nigeria with marginal presence 
in the Southern part.  In all, it merely served to help perpetuate and legitimize 
Abacha’s regime in Nigeria, who died in offi  ce in 1998. 
In General Abdulsalami Abubakar’s att empt to administer the privatization 
program, he affi  rmed in his independence speech of October 1, 1998 that “the 
public sector investments in the provision of services, utilities and goods have 
yielded litt le dividends.”51 He subsequently set up the Bureau of Public enterprises 
(BPE) to oversee the supervision of  the sale of these public enterprises. The exercise 
did not gain popular support because of the command nature of the military and 
the incoming civilian administration of President Olusegun Obasanjo literally 
scrapped the Abubakar privatization program.
The Neoliberal Agenda of the Obasanjo Years
By 1999, the annual Gross Domestic product (GDP) in Nigeria averaged 2.25 
percent while population growth averaged 2.8 percent. This mismatch was a 
guarantee of mass poverty as the index was put at 67 percent, meaning no less 
than eighty million Nigerians were absolutely poor. The cumulative eff ects of 
years of mis-governance had translated to economic stagnation, marked by a 
low GDP, galloping infl ation, high unemployment, falling per capita income, 
48 The Punch Editorial , (Lagos), November 22, 2010, 14.
49  Gary Moser, Scot Rogers and Reinold Ventil, “Nigeria’s experience with SAP,” Occasional 
Paper 148 (Washington. D.C. : IMF publication, March 1997), 43.
 Kunle Amuwo, “Transition as Democratic Regression”, in Nigeria during the Abacha Years, 5.
51  The News Magazine (Lagos), March 29, 1999, 16-17.
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an energy crisis, and  declining industrial capacity. Thus, in 1999, Obasanjo 
inherited not only a fragile state and economy, but also a political economy driven 
cyclically by trade shocks brought about by its dependence on oil. The regime 
also inherited a collapsed industrial support infrastructure.52 The dysfunctional 
state of federal utilities, which had been organizationally crippled by corruption, 
ineffi  ciency, and indebtedness, with many of them not having audited accounts 
for many years, eventually informed Olusegun Obasanjo’s adoption of neoliberal 
principles.  Obasanjo invited the IMF and the World Bank to help provide second 
level quality checks for his macroeconomic policies. Specifi cally, he invited the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC), the private sector arm of the Brett on 
Woods institutions to advise the nation on privatization.53  According to the Bureau 
for Public Enterprises (BPE), the IFC served as the sole adviser of the Federal 
Government with respect to the eff ective implementation of its privatization 
program from its inception in 1999.54  However the IFC pulled out of Nigeria in 
early 2001. It cited the auction of Nigeria’s international air traffi  c rights by the 
Nigerian government as one of the main reasons for its withdrawal.55 Based on 
these challenges, Obasanjo justifi ed his privatization program as an exercise that 
would reposition the government to concentrate resources on its core functions 
and responsibilities while enforcing rules and policies so that markets can work 
effi  ciently. The objective was to make the government leaner and more effi  cient, 
reduce waste and corruption, free up resources tied down by public enterprises, 
and improve service delivery to the people. It was hoped that privatization would 
introduce new capital, technical, and managerial effi  ciency in the privatized 
enterprises, thereby reviving them, creating new jobs, and adding value to the 
economy. A fundamental plank for implementation of the neoliberal ideology is 
the Public-Private Partnership, an alternative source of infrastructure fi nancing, 
which is rooted in a complex but contractual relationship between government 
and private sector organizations. Here, the private sector makes available the 
social welfare services, and the government simply regulates such services and 
provides an enabling environment. Just as Hanson and Hentz  linked the adoption 
52  The Nation Newspaper (Lagos), May 29, 2001, 36.
53  The Guardian Newspaper (Lagos) April 6, 2002.
54  Samuel Aluko, “Federal Reform Agenda and the Nigerian Economy, 1999-2007: A Critical 
Assessment,”2008, accessed January 23, 2013,  
htt p://www.nigerianmuse.com/opessays/?u=Sam_Aluko_Federal_Government_Reform_
Agenda_and_the_Nigerian_Economy_1999_2007_A_Critical_Assessment.htm.
55  In excerpts of a lett er to Obasanjo, IFC vice president Peter Woicke said that “the 
opportunity for a successful near-term privatisation of Nigeria Airways has been diminished 
by the auctioning act,” accessed April 15, 2013, htt p://www.ipsnews.net/2001/05/fi nance-
nigeria-international-fi nance-corporation-pulls-out-of-privatisation-venture/.
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of neoliberal policies in South Africa and Zambia to domestic dynamics within 
those jurisdictions, Nigeria’s adoption of neoliberal principles followed the same 
logic because the policy obtained domestic support from the emerging middle and 
elite class, as they possessed the fi nance capital to buy into the privatized fi rms, 
with litt le or no support from the masses who saw it as further impoverishment.
The template for the framework of the economic reform agenda of President 
Obasanjo was largely infl uenced by the IMF and World Bank (WB).56 Their core 
prescriptions for Nigeria were: (a) Unbundling and privatization of the state 
electricity company; (b) Legislation and technical assistance to promote domestic 
gas sector reforms; (c) Liberalization of the down stream petroleum sector; (d) 
Funding to address key infrastructure constraints; and (e) Legislations for bill 
on fi scal responsibility, procurement and the extractive industries transparency 
initiative. To drive this reform agenda, technocrats from these international 
fi nancial institutions who had neoliberal inclinations were brought on board 
of President Obasanjo’s economic team. They included Ngozi Okonjo Iweala, 
Oby Ezekwesili, and Soludo Charles who later became Governor of the Central 
Bank of Nigeria. Their policy agenda was encapsulated in National Economic 
Empowerment Development Strategy (NEEDS). The IMF and World Bank were 
heavily involved in funding the reform agenda. Since 2001, the World Bank has 
given approximately $300 million in International Development Association (IDA) 
credits for reform and privatization of Nigeria’s energy sector. However, the key 
ingredients of the International Financial Institution’s policy advice meant to 
shape Nigeria’s economic policies have so far led to a dysfunctional electricity 
privatization process failing to eff ectively provide pro-poor energy and encouraged 
kleptocracy in the oil sector as they helped in perpetuating the conditions that 
enable companies operating in the Niger Delta to maintain a monopoly over the 
country’s natural resources.57
On privatization, Nigeria started a four-phased privatization program in 
July 1999. The fi rst phase involved the sale of the government’s shareholdings in a 
dozen of commercially viable enterprises, including banks, petroleum marketing, 
cement, and insurance companies. This was completed in December 2000. The 
second phase, which was to be completed in 2001, rather started late. One salutary 
impact of privatization was that all economic sectors and activities were exposed 
to competition and private initiative. Privatization has created a large pool of 
56  Obiora Chinedu Okafor, “The Precarious Place of Labour Rights and Movement in 
Nigeria’s Dual Economic and Political Transition, 1999-2005,” Journal of African Law 51, no. 
1 (April, 2007), 77.
57  Lucy Baker, “Facilitating Whose Power? The IFI Policy Infl uence in Nigeria’s Energy 
sector,” (2008), accessed January 22, 2013,  
htt p://www.brett onwoodsproject.org/update/60/bwupdt60_ai.pdf.
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new shareholders in Nigeria, bridging both income and geopolitical divides. It 
has changed the structure and depth of the Nigerian capital market and created 
awareness of the virtue of shared ownership as a form of savings. The program 
has relieved the federal government of the huge and growing burden of fi nancing 
debts and defi cits of public enterprises. It has in a way improved the allocative 
effi  ciency of the national economy and enhanced the volume of corporate taxes 
accruing in the national treasury.58  
The downside of the privatization played out with the dynamics of the 
privatization of Nigerian Telecommunications Limited (NITEL) a key item in the 
second phase.59 The Obasanjo regime in February 2001 successfully auctioned 
three Global Satellite Mobile (GSM) licenses and got expressions of interest from 
strategic investors in NITEL.  However ten years down the line, eff orts at selling 
NITEL had been bungled repeatedly as China Unicom, the preferred bidder, had 
not been able to raise suffi  cient funds to unbundle and revitalize it.60 NITEL was 
hastily sold to Transcorp which rationalized NITEL staff  by 70 percent, that is 
7,000 of the 10,000 staff  were retrenched because of the privatization exercise. Ex-
President Obasanjo handed Transcorp back to the late President Yar’adua on May 
27, 2007.61 The Obasanjo (1999-2007) regime virtually sealed the destruction of 
the land telephony system in order to privatize it. In other countries, particularly 
the industrialized ones, the land telephony is the main communication system 
with the mobile telephone system serving as a subsidiary and emergency outfi t to 
complement the land telephone system. 
The mobile telephone system has taken away much revenue from Nigerians 
and from the economy to their providers within and outside Nigeria. The fl ight 
of capital it has occasioned is excessive and most of the employment they created 
is in the informal sector. By 1999, the estimated share of the urban labor force in 
the informal sector in Lagos, Nigeria was 50 percent, Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire, 31 
percent, Nairobi, Kenya 44 percent and Tunis, Tunisia 34 percent. Nigeria had the 
highest fi gure.62 Under Obasanjo, the informal sector thrived and witnessed real 
explosion in the mid-2000s as an enormous proportion of Nigeria’s population was 
58  Zayyad, H.R, “Privatization and Commercialization in Nigeria,” accessed January 
22, 2013, htt p://wiki.projectszoo.com/projectswiki/images/3/39/Privatisation_and_
commercialisation_in_Nigeria.pdf.  
59  OECD, African Economic Outlook: 2001-2002, African Development Bank, Development 
Centre for the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, France, 2002, 230.
60  Nigerian Tribune Editorial (Ibadan), February 24, 2010.
61  Akinpelu Olutayo and Ayokunle Omobowale, “Public Service Reforms and the Nigerian 
Telecommunications (NITEL) PLC,” Development and Society 40, no. 2 (December, 2011): 340.
62  Michael Todaro, “Urbanization, Unemployment and Migration in Africa; Theory and 
Policy” in Renewing Social and Economic Programs in Africa, ed Dharaim Ghai (London: 
Macmillan Press, 2003), 69.
Ekanade  | 17
Journal of Retracing Africa, Volume 1, Issue 1, Spring 2014
htt p://encompass.eku.edu/jora/
employed in this sector. This was parallel to the development of the crisis and the 
implementation of the SAP that led to massive layoff s. The share of people in the 
informal economy in Nigeria is one of the highest in Africa and represented nearly 
75 percent of non-oil GNP in 2003. This is a typical indicator of poverty63. The 
world development indicator also gives credence to this assertion as employment-
to-population ratio in Nigeria fell from 52 percent in 1991 to 51 percent in 2007, 
and the population below global poverty line remained at an all-time high of 86.4 
percent.64 
Nigeria entered the third phase of privatization in 2004 by privatizing 
nineteen enterprises. In 2005, it entered the fourth phase under Irene Chigbue, 
privatizing forty six enterprises and thirty eight others in 2006. In the fourth 
phase, major utilities such as the Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN) 
was unbundled into seventeen successor companies and established the National 
Electricity Regulation Commission (NERC), which set the framework and 
paved the way for the privatization of the electricity sector.65 Up to 2005, about 
N225 billion of taxpayers’ funds were pumped into the power sector to revive 
it alongside the unbundling program66.  The result however is that the reforms 
in the power sector have not translated into any meaningful changes. Power 
supplies remained epileptic as no conscious att empts were made to build new 
power generation and transmission plants. This development has had adverse 
eff ects on the manufacturing sector and small scale businesses where production 
cost is high thereby making fi nished goods uncompetitive with their imported 
counterparts. Another fall out of the spasmodic nature of the public power supply 
in Nigeria is the job loss in the manufacturing sector. This has been massive given 
the exorbitant production costs. In addition, considering the huge population 
trapped in the informal sector, a substantial number of these artisans depend on 
electricity to run their businesses. With frequent power outages, and the hike in 
power tariff s by President Goodluck Jonathan (from N8.00 to N40.00 per kilowatt )67 
the challenges of the masses is further compounded, and they are left jobless. A 
substantial number have resorted to criminal activities in the nation. This explains 
in part why arson, kidnapping, and other criminal activities and social vices are 
thriving in the Niger Delta region and other parts of the Nigerian state. 
It is also important to note that the Obasanjo regime’s inability to handle 
63  Danielle Obono, “Workers and Popular  Masses in Nigeria” (paper presented at the 
Conference of African alternatives: Initiative and Creativity Beyond Current Constraints, 
Leiden, Netherlands, July 11-14, 2007), 2.
64 World Bank, World Development Indicators  (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, April, 2009), 37
65  TELL Magazine (Lagos) May, 2007, 7
66  TELL Magazine (Lagos), June 26, 2006, 50.
67  Nigerian Tribune, (Ibadan), July 1, 2011, 1.
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problems in the power sector defeated its initiative of an export substitution policy 
in Nigeria.68 In fact, the import substitution industries (ISI) policy is the preferred 
model for development in advanced economies as it encourages local production 
instead of the importation of essential products. In terms of economic performance, 
the structural transformation of Nigeria has been slow in the area of privatization. 
Privatization itself has not worked well because of bad governance, corruption, 
non-tariff  barriers, and an inadequate regulatory framework.69 
 In his last days in offi  ce President Obasanjo, sold the Kaduna and Port 
Harcourt refi neries valued at $800 billion in May 2007 for a paltry $500 million 
to Blue Star Oil Service Limited, a consortium close to him.70 In addition, Eleme 
Petrochemicals Plant in Port Harcourt, the largest of its kind in Africa was sold for 
$225 million, an amount not even worth its spare parts. The unfortunate aspect 
is that the Nigerian government was supposed to maintain a minimum share of 
49 percent. However, Indorama, the buyer was given a 75 percent equity stake 
in Eleme. The same occurred with the sale of Egbin Power Station, (the largest 
generating station operated by Power Holding Corporation of Nigeria) which was 
also grossly underpriced and sold off  at a paltry N280 million or $2 million.71
Interestingly, the Nigerian Senate committ ee investigating the privatization 
of public enterprises since 1999 came up with appalling revelations about the 
Obasanjo regime. The committ ee discovered, through its public hearing that the 
regime sold the Aluminum Smelting Company of Nigeria built at the cost of $3.2 
billion to Russal, a Russian fi rm at the cost of $250 million. Only $130 million 
of the said $250 million has been paid, leaving a balance of $120 million, which 
was supposed to be used to dredge the Imo River as stated in the share purchase 
agreement. Six years after the sale, the dredging is yet to begin and the government 
has not been paid the balance of the money. In addition, no one has queried Russal 
for failing to fulfi ll its obligations. Even if the cost of building the smelter was 
infl ated through the procurement process, there is no justifi able reason why an 
asset worth $3.2 billion should be sold for $250 million.72
Delta Steel Company Limited presents another dimension of the fraud 
and irregularities involved in the sale of Nigeria’s public enterprises under the 
Obasanjo regime.  Global Steel Infrastructure Limited, a company that did not 
participate in the bidding process, except that it submitt ed an expression of 
68  TELL Magazine (Lagos), May 2007, 6.
69  Cyril Nweze, CBN Magazine (Lagos), November 2001, 47.
70  Baker, Facilitating whose Power?”
71  Ibid. 
72  Odey Adiza, “Privatization of Public Enterprises and Productivity: Nigeria’s Dilemma,” 
Journal of Emerging Trends in Economics and Management Sciences 2, no. 6 (2011): 493-494. 
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interest, was declared the winner. BUA, which did the follow up with a technical 
bid, did not get the benefi t of the bid. The then Director General of the BPE, Julius 
Bala rationalized this untoward act with the assertion that “there is a diff erence 
between ‘the winner of a bid’ and ‘the preferred winner’ as there is the need for 
approval from council.”73 To compound matt ers, Delta Steel was valued by BPE at 
N225 billion but was sold for a paltry N 4.5 billion. These privatized enterprises 
have not added any meaningful value to the state and people of Nigeria. 
A total sum of N146.6 billion earned from the privatization process has been 
remitt ed to the coff ers of the Nigerian government since 1999. This is a paltry 
sum considering that investments by the government in these enterprises run 
into trillions of naira.  The assets of the privatized enterprises were deliberately 
undervalued, as rules and regulations governing the due process were subverted, 
and this has allowed corruption to fester. Those who withstand the worst of the 
government’s ineptitude now are the masses in the Nigerian state.74
Neoliberalism and Constitutionalism
The Nigerian state embraced planned and balanced economic development 
before 1985. Systematic development plans were made.  Planning of the Nigerian 
economy ceased when the Babangida regime introduced the IMF and World Bank 
imposed SAPs in 1986. However, poor economic planning has been more greatly 
accentuated since 1999, through the deregulation, privatization, and downsizing 
of the public service and general reform agenda of the Obasanjo regime, all 
encapsulated in his National Economic Empowerment Development Strategy 
(NEEDS).75 The economic philosophy of the government was hinged on the fact 
that the “market” has violated the Nigerian constitution, not only by abdicating 
the control of the major sectors of the Nigerian economy, but also by off ering 
Nigeria for sale to domestic and foreign private interests. By 2006, the government 
had divested from 116 enterprises.76 President Obasanjo’s government’s economic 
philosophy was premised on the mistaken assumption that, for the federal 
government to govern effi  ciently, it had to concentrate solely on governance. It 
neglected the fact that a government that cannot manage an industry successfully 
cannot govern effi  ciently.77 
Part of the fallout of the privatization program which has been unpopular 
with the Nigerian citizenry include the reversal of pension benefi ts of public 
73  Punch, (Lagos), August 17, 2011, 45
74  Ibid.
75   Folasade, “The Fourth Republic Economic Reforms in Nigeria,” 410.
76  The Nation (Lagos), May 29, 2009, 86. 
77  Aluko, “Federal Reform Agenda and the Nigerian Economy.” 
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servants under the Pension Reform Act of 2004 and the deduction from their 
monthly wages for pension. Equally appalling are the non-payment of pensions and 
gratuities, the non-creation of employment opportunities and the non-payment of 
unemployment benefi ts to those forced into unemployment. 78 These are violations 
of Article 16, section 2(d) of the Nigerian Constitution.79 The imposition of a 
contributory pension scheme on public servants in the name of pension reform is 
a violation of Article 173 of the Constitution, which seeks to protect the existing 
pension rights of public servants.80 In the words of Lai Olurode, when pension 
rights are not guaranteed, individuals exercise no scruples at engaging in corrupt 
behavior in order to make ends meet. Thus, the denial of pension rights has further 
deepened the challenge of endemic corruption prevalent in Nigeria 
The neoliberal agenda of the Obasanjo regime also went against the spirit 
and tenets of the Constitution on issues of educational objectives of the country. 
Article 18, section 3 of the 1999 Constitution provides that government shall 
strive to eradicate illiteracy and to this end, government shall, as and when 
practicable, provide, free compulsory and universal primary education, free 
secondary education, free university education and free adult literacy program.81 
However, the government worked at cross purposes by introducing public-private 
partnership (PPP) administration in unity schools (public schools). Fees were 
consequently introduced in primary and secondary schools and, very exorbitant 
fees in tertiary institutions alongside private universities. While the introduction 
of fees progressively were reduced, budgetary allocation for education fell from 
11.2 percent in 1999 to 1.8 percent in 2003, all against UNESCO’s recommendation 
of 26 percent for developing countries. Budgetary shortfalls undermined 
productivity of Nigerian intellectuals, starved knowledge institutions of vital 
resources for research, and adversely aff ected the quality of teaching and learning. 
Cumulatively, it has led to the peripheralization for the country’s intellectual 
community as an aspect of the general strategy of strengthening neocolonial 
imperialism in Nigeria. Furthermore, it has created a knowledge weak Nigerian 
state in a century that is knowledge driven. 82 Overall, the cumulative impact of all 
these actions and inactions of government are that education at all levels is now 
becoming increasingly less and less available to a decreasing percentage of the 
Nigerian population, further deepening the impoverishment of not just the people 
78   The Guardian (Lagos), November 14, 2006, 57.




82  Okpeh Okpeh, “Neoliberal Reforms, the Nigerian University System and the Challenges 
of the 21st century,” in Quill Pen, vol. 6 (Ibadan: Recard Publisher, 2007), 52-53.
Ekanade  | 21
Journal of Retracing Africa, Volume 1, Issue 1, Spring 2014
htt p://encompass.eku.edu/jora/
but also the nation as a whole. Thus, Nigeria stands the risk of being delinked from 
the gains and prospects of an increasingly globalized and competitive world.
Retrenchment in the Public Sector and Precarization of Labor
From the outset, a central thrust of neoliberal policies was wage and social 
austerity for workers to restore the profi tability of capitalist fi rms and the capacity 
of the state to assist in economic restructuring.83 In line with this thinking, since the 
inception of the Obasanjo regime in 1999, about 4.8 million Nigerians in the civil 
service, statutory corporations, state owned companies, in the banks, and insurance 
companies have been retrenched through the reform agenda of re-engineering the 
public sector of the economy and minimizing the economic role of government. 
It has continued to place emphasis on the private sector as the engine of growth 
of the Nigerian economy, whereas the private sector in Nigeria is very weak 
and depends on the public sector for its survival and continued growth. Given 
the warped reform policy, the downsizing of the public sector has consequently 
led to the downsizing of the private sector, because the economic managers in 
government do not appreciate that a decelerating public sector also leads to a 
decelerating private sector, and vice versa. All sensible reformers in history have 
increased rather than reduced employment quantum in very signifi cant manner. 
Neoliberalism, market fundamentalism, privatization, commercialization, and 
minimization of the role of the government in the economy do not collectively 
off er eff ective results for reducing poverty, because they do not suffi  ciently build 
or rebuild human capital. The type of privatization pursued by the successive 
Nigerian regimes has allowed cronyism, the plundering of national assets for the 
benefi t of the few in the elite class. 84 The policy model itself off ers very litt le and 
warrants litt le or no support as a suffi  cient economic policy directive for serious 
people-oriented policies. It does not address nor promote equitable income 
distribution, or a decent economic and social environment. The regime overlooked 
the political and social context of the malfunctioning public service. The reforms 
do not address substantive issues of equity and social justice in light of the 
distributive consequences of the restructuring. Consequently, the mere change of 
ownership from public to private has not guaranteed change in productivity and 
effi  ciency. This is besides the question of corruption and institutional crisis, which 
may equally bedevil a private company. In fact, several private fi rms have not 
performed much bett er than public companies in Nigeria 85
83  Gregory Albo, “The Crisis of Neoliberalism and the Impasse of the Union Movement,” 
Development Dialogue, 5 (January 2009):119-132.
84  Folasade, “The Fourth Republic Economic Reforms in Nigeria,” 411.
85  David Adeyemo, Adeleke Salami, Lanre Adeyemi, “An Appraisal of Economic Reforms in 
Nigeria,” Contemporary Management Research, 4, no. 2 (June 2008): 129.
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Most of the resources derived from privatizing public enterprises, for 
instance, has not been directed toward building human capital through education 
and training, to stimulate productivity in the economy. Retrenchment of workers 
with productive application of revenue further depressed the economy. In an ideal 
situation, new competent workers would be employed and that would stimulate 
the economy.  Downsizing of the public sector has negative multiplier eff ects. 
Retrenchment leads to reduced consumer demand, which reduces the propensity 
to produce, and in turn leads to a reduction in the rate of growth of the gross 
domestic product. It is a suicidal economic policy.
Nigeria’s adoption of the New Economic Partnership for Development 
(NEPAD), which is based on some classic pillars of neoliberal economic policies, 
helps to dramatize the negative impact of privatization, using the activities of 
South African fi rms in Nigeria as a case study. 86 NEPAD was adopted by African 
states in October 2001 with the objective of regenerating and integrating African 
economies.87 Under Obasanjo’s regime, then South African President Thabo Mbeki 
surreptitiously used NEPAD as a platform to open up Nigeria’s economy to South 
African investments and exports. The implications of this South African penetration 
have been inimical to the robust growth of the Nigerian economy. Joseph Stiglitz , 
a renowned economist and Nobel Prize winner, affi  rmed that neither theory nor 
economic evidence supports the claim that opening up your market can assure 
robust economic growth.88 A case in point is the Nigerian telecommunication sector 
where the South African fi rm, MTN is about the biggest player. MTN obtained its 
operating license in Nigeria in 2001 after paying over $285 million as license fee 
and another $1 billion to set up operations. In 2004 alone, MTN recorded an after 
tax profi t of over $2.4 billion in Nigeria.89 This amounts to over profi teering and 
massive exploitation of Nigerians who are the subscribers. 
A number of South African companies have also entered the fast food business 
in Nigeria, controlling almost 50 percent of the international fast food franchises 
in Nigeria. They are also making huge profi ts. In the media and entertainment 
industry in Nigeria, a South African company such as DSTV accounts for 80 
86  Aluko Olokun, The AU and NEPAD in Foreign Policy in Nigeria’s Democratic Transition 
(Abuja: Presidential Advisory Council on International Relations, 2005), 152-154.
87  Adeolu Durotoye, “The Politics of Globalisation” in Topics and Issues in International 
Relations, ed. Adegbulu Femi (Ogun: Babcock University Press, 2011), 131.
88  Joseph Stiglitz , Globalization and its Discontents. (New York: Norton, 2002), 21. See also 
Kurt Bayer, “Neoliberalism and Development Policy: Dogma or Progress,” Development 
Dialogue 51 (January 2009): 89-102.
89  Shawn Hatt ingh, South Africa’s Role in Nigeria and the Nigerian Elections, International 
Labor Research and Information Group, Cape Town South, 2010, accessed February 25, 
2012, htt p://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2007/hatt ingh260607.html, 5.
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percent of the viewers that watch satellite television in Nigeria.90 Despite all these 
investments by South Africa in Nigeria, the people of Nigeria have not benefi tt ed 
much. This is partly because South African corporations operating in Nigeria are 
allowed to repatriate the profi ts they make out of Nigeria. The majority of South 
African fi rms in Nigeria also source most of the products that they use or sell in 
Nigeria through South Africa and not locally, negating the creation of upstream or 
downstream industries in Nigeria. South African companies operating in Nigeria 
have also created very few jobs. The few they have created have tended to be 
casual. Though not peculiar to South African companies, many Nigerians who 
work in South African owned fi rms have been denied the right to join trade unions. 
For example, MTN has only about 500 permanent jobs.91 Most of its employees are 
casual or temporary workers. 
Conclusion 
Nigeria’s National Development Plans between 1962 and 1980 emphasized the 
central role of the government in economic planning. This ensured progressive 
development and stability of the economy and society. Military intervention 
truncated the entire process as it progressively eclipsed public provision of social 
welfare services, substituted it with ad-hoc welfare structures to legitimize and 
perpetuate successive military rules, sett ing in motion the wholesale marketization 
of social welfare services. The neoliberal orthodoxy was perpetuated paradoxically 
by subsequent democratic regimes without the consent of the citizens. The 
civil regimes privatized the state and substituted public good as private good, 
overlooking the fact that governance is a social contract in which the individual 
abrogates some of his rights to the state and in return enjoys some social benefi ts, 
which fundamentally include protection of life, human dignity, and social welfare. 
The neglect of the welfare of the citizenry has contributed immensely to the crisis 
of development.  More importantly, the proponents of neoliberal policies have 
confessed that they did not consider the  African or Asian economic scenes when 
they propounded their economic manifesto, believing same to be valid for all 
places and at all times. The proponents also admit that liberalization does not 
necessarily imply a swing to market fundamentalism and a minimalist role for 
government.92 For instance, the sponsors of the Brett on Woods institutions ensure 
that neoliberalism coexists with strong protectionism and a desire to heavily 
subsidize some markets in the United States.93 Neoliberalism has promoted 
90  Hatt ingh, “South Africa’s Role in Nigeria and the Nigerian Elections.” 
91  Hatt ingh, “South Africa’s Role in Nigeria and the Nigerian Elections.” See also The Punch 
(Lagos), April 7, 2012.
92  Aluko, “Federal Reform Agenda and the Nigerian Economy.”
93  Harrison, “Economic Faith, Social Project,” 1305.
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various lock-in mechanisms to insulate economic policy from democratic rule 
and popular accountability. This has encouraged capital fl ight, authoritarianism, 
corruption, the mushrooming of the informal sector, coupled with unprecedented 
casualization and precarization of labor. All of these have cumulatively deepened 
poverty and crime in Nigeria, thus undermining the very essence of a democratic 
state which ought to uphold social rights.  
Rather than stick to the principles outlined by the Brett on Woods institutions, 
a new economic policy should be employed that more adequately refl ects the goals 
of development and enhances the chances of local rather than foreign ownership 
of the means of production for more rapid and equitable economic growth. The 
government must practice home-grown development policies that fulfi l the 
developmental aspirations of the masses. Under the reign of neoliberalism in 
Nigeria, capital and wealth have been largely distributed upwards, while civic 
virtues have been undermined by a mindless celebration of the free market as 
the model for organizing all facets of everyday life. Under att ack is the social 
contract with its emphasis on enlarging the public good and expanding social 
provisions such as access to adequate health care, housing, employment, public 
transportation, and education, all of which provided both safety nets and a set of 
conditions upon which democracy could be experienced and critical citizenship 
engaged.94 
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